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LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION:
"THERE OUGHT TO BE A LAW"- OR OUGHT THERE?
ROBFRT L. HowARD*

Much legislation over the years, both good and bad, has had its genesis
in the ill-considered impulse of someone that "there ought to be a law."
Not infrequently the initial question of whether legislation is really needed
or desirable merits more serious consideration than the pros and cons as to
its proper content once the initial decision has been arrived at. In the
present problem both considerations are highly important and great differences of intelligent opinion exist as to both.
When one has in mind that at common law an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes has no binding effect, and that an agreement to arbitrate an
existing dispute may be abrogated by either party at any time prior to the
handing down of an award without suffering any adverse legal consequences,
the suggestion that "there ought to be a law" by which parties are required
to abide by such agreements may seem worthy of immediate acceptance.
And when one further has in mind that instances do sometimes arise, at
least in some areas, when parties to such agreements refuse to go to arbitration, that they have been known, albeit on rare occasions, to refuse to carry
out an award once it is handed down, and that there seems to be much lack
of clarity in the minds of many lawyers as to how to proceed to enforce an
award against a recalcitrant party, the suggestion may seem to take on
additional merit.
On the other hand, before one succumbs to the arguments supporting
the soundness of the timeworn saying in its application to the case of
labor-management arbitration, the basic nature of that institution should
be carefully considered.
All persons conversant with this problem are familiar with the fact that
the traditional arbitration clause as the final step in the grievance procedure
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. University of Missouri, 1917,
A.M. 1918, LL.B. 1925; S.J.D. Harvard, 1933.
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in a collective bargaining agreement sets up the procedure by which the
parties themselves select their arbitrator, or arbitration board, with provision for resort to some other authority to make, or assist in making, the
selection if the parties are unable to agree, and that it further uniformly
provides that the arbitration award, when made, shall be accepted as final
and binding by both parties, -with no appeal to or review by any other
authority.
This whole procedure, then, becomes a part of the privately created
machinery which the parties voluntarily set up for the governance of their
day to day relations. So long as it can be kept on a wholly voluntary basis
it seems clear that it will continue to serve its intended purpose. It is the
willingness of the parties to honor their agreements to accept the arbitration process as controversies arise, and their willingness to honor their
agreement to accept the arbitration awards as final and binding, that makes
the whole system effective, and acceptable to the parties on any long range
basis.
One must have in mind that it is only an occasional controversy that
goes to arbitration. The great majority of disputes that arise in the conduct
of any industrial enterprise are settled at some stage of the grievance procedure without the necessity of calling on the arbitration process. This
grievance procedure, which all modern collective bargaining agreements
provide for, is the machinery, devised by the parties by their own voluntary
bargaining process, by which they iron out their disputes and misunderstandings, arrive at settlements and implement their relationships in the
industrial process. This is a part, and a major part, of their own selfgoverning process. For the settlement of those few controversies which the
parties are not able to resolve in their direct contact adjustment process
within the prior steps of the grievance procedure, the final step of arbitration, again of their own devising, comes into play. But it is their process
which they have formulated for themselves and which is merely the capstone of their grievance settlement procedure. They have no purpose to
submit their dispute to the adjudication of any public or governmental
agency, either judicial or administrative, but only to their own privately
created machinery which has its existence solely by virtue of their agreement and from which it derives its powers. It is, in many respects, the last
step in the bargaining process, when other efforts at settlement have failed,
and without which the sole recourse would be to economic force.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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It is important to keep in mind that the authority of the arbitrator
rests not upon any law or administrative order or regulation, but upon the
voluntary agreement of the parties. It is the agreement of the parties, in
their submission agreement or otherwise, that determines his authority and
fixes his responsibility, and not any official regulation or statutory enactment. Equally significant is the fact that the arbitrator's award is made
final and binding upon the parties solely as a result of their own voluntary
election and not through any governmental compulsion, judicial or otherwise.
The purpose and the conduct of labor-management arbitration is not
on a par with the functioning of a governmental agency whose decisions
are enforceable by the courts and are necessarily subject to some measure
of judicial review. If a court enforces an arbitration award, or an agreement to abitrate, it does so, not by way of enforcing a decision of an official
or governmental agency, and based on some statutory criterion, but solely
on the theory of contract obligation between the parties, both of whom have
solemnly agreed to accept the award as final and binding and each of whom
has relied upon the promise of the other as the quid pro quo for giving up
any possible use of economic power to which he might otherwise have resorted. This is further emphasized when we keep firmly in mind that labormanagement arbitration is strictly a substitute for resort to. economic force
and not in any sense a substitute for litigation as in the case of commereial arbitration.
No analogy to court review of the administrative process is to be found
in such a situation. The administrative tribunal is created by statute, and
the administrative process is a process of adjudication by an authoritative,
governmental agency. The enforcement of its decrees and their review to
determine conformity to statutory or constitutional requirements are obviously functions for the courts, however desirable it may be to limit the
scope of the reviewing court's authority.
But the arbitration process as a purely voluntary arrangement between
the parties, representing the culminating step in a privately created procedure for the settlement of grievances, the determinations of which the
parties, as the sole creators of that machinery, have expressly agreed shall
be final and binding, stands in clear contrast. The very nature of the collective bargaining agreement, of which the grievance and arbitration processes are a major part, makes clear that the parties rely on each other's
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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willingness to abide by the obligations to which they have pledged their
word. When the parties can no longer rely on adherence to these obligations, the grievance procedure, and especially the arbitration process as
the final step in that procedure, will have ceased to perform its intended
function in the peaceful disposition of industrial conflicts.
Any analysis of the process of labor-management arbitration as it now
exists must start with this conception of a purely private and voluntary,
non-official, non-governmental, institution. Legislation that directs its procedures and subjects its functioning to judicial control, and its awards to
judicial review, largely converts it from its original private nature and
attempts to bring it within the legal system, or the system of the administration of justice, like the administrative tribunal, and makes it a part of that
legal system of which appeals and judicial review are recognized as a usual,
if not an essential, part.
It has been suggested that the price to be paid in this process of transformation, in terms of weakening or destroying voluntarily arbitration, may
be too great for the alleged advantages supposed to flow from a comprehensive arbitration statute.
Such, at least, are some of the considerations involved on both sides
of the initial question as to whether any legislation, of whatever nature,
applicable to labor-management arbitration is necessary or desirable.
With something in excess of ninety per cent of the present day 100,000
or more collective bargaining agreements providing for arbitration as the
terminal point of the grievance procedure, and with the practice of arbitration being tremendously increased in the industrialized areas throughout
the country, there have emerged widely and increasingly suggestions from
various sources that legislation should be enacted, applicable to labormanagement arbitration, that would, among other things, provide readily
available procedure for enforcing agreements to arbitrate, provide for the
expeditious enforcement of arbitration awards, regulate in greater or less
detail the arbitration procedure, and give some degree of authority to the
courts to modify or vacate arbitration awards on some more or less limited
bases. These proposals have varied all the way from the very simple provision to make agreements to arbitrate in the future enforceable, with or
without some enumeration of procedures for enforcement of awards, to the
comprehensive, complex and detailed statute setting forth a long list of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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bases for modifying or vacating awards and subjecting them to a large
measure of judicial review. While suggestions for legislation of this nature
have emanated from various sources, some confined to a single state and
some on a wider basis, particular emphasis has been given to the problem
by the somewhat lengthy consideration at the hands of the National Academy of Arbitrators, and by the action of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its 1955 meeting giving final approval
to comprehensive legislation applicable to both commercial and labormanagement arbitration, in the form of a Uniform Arbitration Act, and
with the approval of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1955 meeting, submitting the Act to the legislatures of the
various states for adoption.'
There is no purpose to include in this article a detailed statement of
the present status of arbitration legislation, but it is appropriate to observe
that a majority of the states do have arbitration statutes of a sort, the
great majority of which were drafted specifically for commercial arbitration, as was the federal Arbitration Act. Several of the state statutes have
been amended to provide for their applicability to labor-management arbitration. A goodly proportion of these statutes are in terms applicable only
to disputes that may be made the subject of an action at law or of a suit
in equity, and a major reason for the present movement for legislative
action is the fact that neither at common law nor under many of these
statutes is the agreement to arbitrate future disputes, even of this limited
character, enforceable. All such statutes do provide, however, for enforcement of arbitration awards, which are also enforceable at common law by
what is possibly a somewhat less expeditious process.2

1. Perhaps the most vigorous and consistent exponent or proponent of this
legislation, if not the originator of the idea, has been the American Arbitration
Association which has had an opportunity to observe at close range the problems
as they have arisen and been dealt with by the courts for a number of years in
the state of New York under a statute dating back to 1920. Reliance on court
intervention has apparently been much more widespread in New York than elsewhere, yet the performance of the New York courts in the field of labor-management arbitration has done little to support the desirability of such a practice.
2. The most complete survey of arbitration legislation available is that
published by the United States Department of Labor in 1943 under the title,
LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER STATE STATUTES. Other useful materials include
Dowell, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in Labor Disputes, 3
RUTGEaS L. Rnv. 65 (1949); Epstein, Legal Aspects of Labor Arbitration,
N. Y. U. SEcoND ANNUAL CONFERNCE ON LABOR, p. 383 (1949); FREIDiN,
LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS (1952) ; Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforce-

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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It is the purpose of this paper to give consideration to the arguments
pro and con as to the need for and desirability of any such legislation;
whether such legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration, if any,
should be separate and different from that applicable to commercial arbitration; whether it should be on a state or a national level; if on a state-level,
whether uniform legislation is desirable; and finally, some of the considerations relative to its content.
There was a time not so long ago when the representatives of labor
almost uniformly opposed legislation of this sort. Possibly this was a part
of the general reluctance on the part of Unions to have the courts enter
the labor-management relationship on any basis which was a rather natural
reaction from their unfortunate experience in the application of the labor
injunction. With the more recent almost universal acceptance by labor of
arbitration as the terminal point of the grievance procedure in collective bargaining agreements, and apparently with the feeling that some contracting
parties are too frequently reluctant to go to arbitration and may, on occasion, be disinclined to abide by arbitration awards, there appears to
have been some modification of this attitude of opposition on the part of
labor. The existing attitude of both labor and management with respect to
the desirability of such legislation appears to depend to a considerable
extent upon local experience, and accordingly that attitude varies greatly
from one industrial area to another and from state to state.
No effort will be made in this article to make an extended list of persons active in the field of labor relations who have expressed their views
with respect to this problem, but attention may, not inappropriately, be
called to the work of the "Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation"
in Pennsylvania under the chairmanship of Mr. M. Herbert Syme of
Philadelphia, a transcript of whose hearings held in 1953 contains statements of several men of extensive experience in this field, invited on a tripartite basis, including several distinguished scholars, teachers and arbitrators, along with outstanding representatives of both labor and management, and indicating varying shades of opinion. Both within this group

ment of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 UNIV. OF Cur. L. REv. 233 (1950);
Lillard, State ArbitrationStatutes Applicable to Labor Disputes, 19 Mo. L. REV.
280 (1954) ; Plock, Methods Adopted by States for Settlement of Labor Disputes

Without Original Recourse to Courts, 34 IowA L. REv. 430 (1949)and many
others. (See also Prentice-Hall and Commerce Clearing House loose leaf services).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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and elsewhere contrariety of opinion exists without regard to which segment of the tripartite representation the individual may be identified with.
A recognition of the arguments pro and con as to the need for and desirability of such legislation seems to be appropriate as a basis for some
detailed consideration of their merits and as criteria from which to judge
proposed or existing legislation in the field.

I. AnGU=NTS FOB LEGISLATION ArprcAnTi
ArxITRATioN

TO

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

The strongest arguments on behalf of such legislation are usually
directed to the fact, recognized above, that agreements to arbitrate future
disputes, or even existing disputes, are not enforceable at common law, and
that a party can withdraw from an arbitration proceeding and repudiate
his agreement to arbitrate at any time prior to the making of an award.
It is also suggested that reliance upon the common law for enforcement of
arbitration awards is hardly satisfactory, since, it is alleged, a lengthy lawsuit with probable delaying appellate review is likely to be involved, thus
destroying the practical value the award would have if expeditiously enforced. Whether substantially the same statement may not be equally
directed to the enforcement process under statute, and whether resort to
the courts, always unfortunate, may be encouraged by the existence of the
statute, are matters for subsequent consideration. The arguments here recorded for legislation are largely grounded on the assumptions, first, that
resort to the courts is essential, and second, that the common law does not
provide an adequate remedy. These assumptions are both vigorously refuted
by those opposed to such legislation, particularly so as to the first. And
while those who support such legislation freely admit that the vast majority
of parties to collective bargaining agreements, probably 98 or 99 per cent
or more, live up to their agreements to go to arbitration and to accept
awards as final and binding, the other 1 or 2 per cent may refuse, and if
they are permitted thus to defeat their obligations, so the argument runs,
the recognized status of voluntary arbitration as the final step in the settlement of labor-management disputes may well be substantially undermined
and, by the possible resort to economic force, the stability of the collective
bargaining relationship likewise weakened in the process.
In the light of these suggestions, proposed legislation making all agreements to arbitrate binding and enforceable, and providing procedure for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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expeditious enforcement of arbitration awards has developed substantial
support. Beyond that point, however, pronounced differences of opinion
readily assert themselves.
While the above matters are those usually asserted as giving rise to
the need for legislation, few if any proposed or existing statutes are so
limited. Most statutes, as illustrated by that existing in New York and the
new Uniform Arbitration Act, contain, among other things, more or less
detailed provisions for the appointment of arbitrators by the court under
specified circumstances, the use of depositions and subpoenas, the authority
of the court to compel or to stay the arbitration prwcess, and to modify or
vacate the award on numerous stated grounds, with provisions for appeal
as in other civil actions.
Much greater controversy arises with respect to these latter provisions
than concerning the former matters listed as giving rise to the general
arguments in favor of such legislation. Some attention will be given to
these provisions later.

II.

ARGu ENTS AGAIST LGISLATION APPLICABLE TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT
ARBITRATION

Two general types of arguments are advanced against legislation of
this nature. The first is based on the feeling that such legislation is not
necessary. The second, which is not entirely separate from the first, emphasizes a possible danger to the continued effective development of voluntary
labor-management arbitration as we now know it by the enactment of such
legislation. Much of the emphasis in both is directed to the importance of
promoting and encouraging the arbitration process and the necessity for
keeping the whole process on a voluntary basis.
This, of course, relates itself to the larger question of where we want
to go in labor relations. Do we want more or less government control'
Are we to have more or less government intervention in the handling of
industrial relations ? Do we want to extend government intervention, which
so readily lends itself to the snow-balling process, or do we want to encourage the parties to manage their own relationships, including the final disposition of their controversies through their own privately devised processes ? Do we want to start the process of converting this privately regulated
relationship in the settlement of grievances and the disposition of controhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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versies by private voluntary arbitration into a government controlled relationship, either administratively or judicially, or should we take cognizance
of the tremendous strides that have been made in the past dozen years or
so in developing and implementing machinery for the processing and settlement of grievances, and their final disposition by private arbitration free
from the hand of government, take cognizance of and pride in the far
reaching contributions the parties have made and are making toward industrial peace through wholly private processes, and permit the experimental
development to continue wholly unhampered?
Anyone who reads this article is likely to remember that the major
accomplishment of the President's Labor-Management Conference of. November, 1945, was the unanimous recommendation that pr6vision for arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure be included in all
collective bargaining agreements. The proof of the value of voluntary
arbitration in the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes in the years
since that date, as well as before, and its bright promise for the future demand that we should continue to make the encouragement of its use our
principal concern.
Perhaps we should direct our major efforts to the improvement of the
private processes of grievance settlement and voluntary arbitration, rather
than seeking to inject government control, through the courts or otherwise,
into the process. To the extent that we provide for government intervention, even by the process of judicial enforcement, may we thereby weaken
the reliance of the parties on the processes they have created by which they
dispose of their differences by mutual agreement, or by the process of
voluntary arbitration which they have set up by mutual agreement? If we
measure the progress of these processes by reference to the relationship of
labor and industry only a few short years ago, the results are little short of
phenomenal. Can we not well be patient and allow a little more time for
the continued working out of this voluntary cooperative process? Above
all else we must be careful to do nothing that would discourage its use or
slow its development.
In this connection it is worth while to observe the testimony of Dr.
George W. Taylor before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on
Labor Legislation emphasizing his belief that the less legislation on this
subject the better, that the soundest policy is to keep the government out
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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of the field and to encourage the parties to set up and rely finally upon
their own machinery.'
In somewhat similar fashion Dr. Alexander Frey of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, in the same proceeding, expressed grave doubt
as to the desirability of such legislation and the possible adverse effect it
may have on voluntary arbitration and labor relations on a long range
basis. He would keep legislation to a minimum and probably go no further
than "to revise some judicial errors that may have crept into this field of
the law." Better draftsmanship of the arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements is suggested as a more feasible long range basis of
attack.'
Others have emphasized that the most that any such legislation should
do in application to labor-management arbitration would be to provide
that provisions in collective bargaining agreements for the arbitration of
existing or future disputes shall be valid, binding, enforceable and irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. Such a limited provision would, apparently,
provide the needed revision of "judicial errors" referred to above, and
would have the merit, in the minds of its sponsors, that the parties would
not encounter the rather detailed procedural requirements common in most
legislation of this nature. In this connection we are reminded that the
facilities of the common law could be relied on for enforcement, and that
any shortcomings in the remedies thus provided may be more than counterbalanced by "freedom from the multitudinous motions to compel arbitration, motions to stay arbitration, motions to review, and motions to enforce,
which are the inevitable consequences of integrating labor arbitration into
a statutory procedure intended and probably necessary for the determination of commercial disputes".' In this connection it must be observed that
the disposition of these various and sundry motions are all subject to appeal
and further judicial review.
If there is any inclination to doubt the delaying possibilities in this
connection under such proposed legislation, one need only take a casual look

3. Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, February 16, 1953, pp. 63-64.
4. Id., March 6, 1953, at pp. 88-95.
5. Id., May 29, 1953, at pp. 42-46.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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at the Uniform Arbitration Act which, in addition to authorizing court
proceedings (1) to compel arbitration, (2) to stay arbitration [Section 2];
(3)to appoint arbitrators [Section 3]; (4) to confirm an award [Section
11] ; (5) to vacate an award, with seven distinct and varying grounds upon
the basis of which the award may be vacated by court action [Section 12];
and (6) to modify or correct an award on three distinct bases [Section 13] ;
makes specific provision for appeal from "(1) an order denying an application to compel arbitration . . ., (2) an order granting an application to compel arbitration . .., (3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award, (4) an order modifying or correcting an award, (5)
an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing," plus any
further "(6) . . . judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions
of this act". As to all it is provided that "the appeal shall be taken in the
manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil
action" [Section 19 (a) and (b)].
Such a casual glance reads content into the "multitudinous motions"
over which the above quotation expressed concern.
It is suggested that the confusion and delays attendant upon the application of all of these, and many other, statutory provisions bid fair to
modify substantially the existing simple, informal, expeditious process of
voluntary labor-management arbitration, and to set up a reliance on court
proceedings as the final step to which the once final process of arbitration
may well become a preliminary. It has been well said that "The essence of
the arbitral process is that it leads to a quick, final and binding decision
which is designed to be the end point, and not the starting point of a
dispute.""
From a wholly different source comes the similar suggestion that the,
success of labor-management arbitration is due almost entirely to the voluntary acceptance of the whole process by both management and labor,
and that we are better off without such proposed legislation because of the
delay, uncertainty and consequent confusion resulting from judicial intervention and judicial review of arbitration decisions.
The importance of keeping labor-management arbitration on a completely voluntary basis can hardly be overemphasized. It is, of course,

6.

Id., April 8, 1953, at p. 69.
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initially a private arrangement entered into wholly voluntarily by the
parties for the final settlement of non-legal controversies by a neutral third
party as a means of preventing resort to economic force, and controversies
which neither party ordinarily would be willing to submit to the determination of a court. Those who oppose such legislation as here under consideration feel strongly that labor-management arbitration will serve its intended
purpose fully effectively only when the parties to it regard the arbitrator's
award as finally and completely binding in all cases without possible resort
to the courts. And they feel equally strongly that when the artificial prop
of recourse to judicial intervention is provided by statute, with its alleged
encouragement of the parties to regard that as the final step in the procedure, the chances that it will ever achieve its full effectiveness are likely
to be measurably lessened. Furthermore, it is believed that a statute providing numerous bases upon which a court may inquire into and set aside an
arbitration award is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic purposes
which the parties to a collective bargaining agreement seek to implement
when they include in that agreement a provision for private arbitration
and stipulate that the determination of the arbitrator, or the arbitration
board, shall be accepted as final and binding by both parties to the agreement. One witness before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission expressed somewhat the same thought by saying, "Unless the arbitrator's
award is made as final as possible you will defeat the whole thinking of
arbitration and you start your round of litigation. We are trying to avoid
that litigation and find a speedy end to the difficulty of the parties"."
Some who believe legislation of the sort here under consideration is
undesirable and who are deeply concerned about maintaining the completely
voluntary character of labor-management arbitration in all of its aspects
have made the suggestion that since it is a substitute for resort to economic
force, the sanctions for possible refusal to conform to an agreement to go to
arbitration or to carry out an award should be left up to the parties' own
devising. The strike or the lockout, or the threat thereof, it is sometimes
suggested, could be used instead of resort to the courts on the theory that
the government should be kept entirely out of the process except in serious
emergencies, and that the more drastic remedy of economic self help would
be a more potent persuasive to abide by the obligations to go to arbitration
or to accept an award than a possible resort to the courts.
7. Id., at p. 9.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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Without endorsing these suggestions as pointing the way to the desirable solution, it is not inappropriate to observe in this connection that
the provision for arbitration usually goes hand in hand with a no-strike,
no-lockout clause. *When the parties agree on arbitration as the final step
in the grievance procedure in their collective bargaining agreement, they,
at the same time, commonly agree to forego their right to resort to economic
force and thus place their full reliance upon final and binding arbitration.
And in a good many instances both unions and companies agree to give up
this right only with considerable reluctance. If arbitration is not to be final,
whether by being made subject to some measure of court review by vacation
of awards, et cetera, or otherwise, the reasons and the justifications for having given up their right to resort to economic force would certainly seem
to be materially weakened if not destroyed. To the extent that the arbitration award is not to be final, to that extent those reasons and justifications
largely or completely cease to exist.
In reply to the suggestion of self help it is pointedly asserted that, as a
practical matter, reliance on such economic sanctions frequently would be
a wholly inadequate remedy. Seldom, if ever, would an employer find it
feasible to shut down his plant in order to force a recalcitrant union to go
to arbitration or conform to an award. In like fashion, similar reliance by
a union would often be a wholly ineffective remedy, as in the case of a
seasonal employment when a strike would be a wholly useless weapon during
a layoff or enforced vacation.8 The injury to the public by invoking such
sanctions is also emphasized as a strong consideration against resort thereto.
In somewhat the same connection, those who prefer to rely upon the
remedies provided by statute rather than self help, or what they regard as
the inadequate machinery of the common law, emphasize that it may well
be more or less a useless process to provide for arbitration of grievances and
have an arbitrator decide that "A" should have been promoted, or that
"B" has been unfairly discharged, and then have no orderly process for
effective enforcement of the award."
The partial reply to this, of course, is the suggestion that reasonably
effective enforcement, even if somewhat less expeditious, is available at com-

8. Id., May 29, 1953, pp. 66-67.
9. Id., February 16, 1953, pp. 9-10.
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mon law,1" and without the open invitation and encouragement to reliance
upon resort to the courts provided by the proposed legislation.
As suggested above, prevailing viewpoints with respect to this problem
may vary from one area to another, largely dependent upon local experience.
Thus, local references are not inappropriate.
This general problem has been before the Labor Law Committee of the
Missouri Bar intermittently over a period of years and the reaction resulting
from its rather mature consideration may very well serve to demonstrate
one point of view based upon experience in one area.
In 1949 a sub-committee of the Labor Law Committee of the Missouri
Bar drafted a proposed "Voluntary Labor-Management Arbitration Act"
for the State of Missouri, patterned largely on the New York Act and not
greatly different from the new Uniform Arbitration Act. Due to the development of serious doubt among the membership of the full Committee
as to the need for such legislation and the feeling that its effect might be to
discourage rather than encourage voluntary labor-management arbitration,
the measure was never completed and given approval by the full Committee
and never presented to the state legislature. When the present proposed
Uniform Arbitration Act was made available from the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws following the 1954 meeting, copies
were circulated to all members of that Committee for serious study. At its
midyear meeting in February of 1955, with 23 members present, all experienced in labor relations and in arbitration and representing about
equally management and labor, with some four or five who would be classed
as representatives of the public, this Committee went on record almost unanimously as being strongly opposed to any such legislation, including the
proposed Uniform Arbitration Act. It has been recently suggested by a
10. See 6 WILISTON, CONTRACTS,
RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF CONTRACTS,

§ 1927, p. 5387 et seq. (Rev. Ed. 1938);
§ 445 (1932); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain
Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680 (1925); Park Construction Co.
v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941); Hamlin

v. Duke, 28 Mo. 166 (1859); Bunnell v. Reynolds, 226 S.W. 614 (Mo. App.
1920); Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 274 S.W. 901 (Mo. App. 1925); Continental Bank & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, Local

243, 239 Mo. App. 1247, 201 S.W.2d 531 (1947); McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co., 273 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App. 1954); Rueda v. Union Pacific Railroad, 180 Ore. 133, 175 P.2d 778 (1946). For reference to cases from many
other jurisdictions see, Dowell, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in
Labor Disputes, 3 RUT-Rns L. Rnv. 65 (1949); Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. or CHI. L. REv. 233 (1950);
FRIEDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS (1952).
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well known student of this problem that about the only people who now
oppose legislation of this nature are professors and arbitrators. In this case
the only two committee members who were at all inclined to favor such
legislation were two of the public representatives. Two members of the
original three-man sub-committee who drafted the proposed act in 1949,
those representing labor and industry, were present and expressed themselves as vigorously opposed, saying they had once thought such legislation
might be desirable but that further experience in the field and more mature
consideration had convinced them otherwise.
The opposition was largely grounded on the belief that such legislation
is wholly unnecessary in Missouri and in the Midwest area. That belief
is based on experience. It practically never happens in this area that a
party to a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause
refuses to honor his obligation to go to arbitration when a case arises, and
with equal uniformity it practically never happens that a party to an
arbitration award fails or refuses to abide by that award. If an occasional
case should arise, it is argued that it is better to leave the matter to the
common law. In what is apparently the only recent case in this area of
refusal to abide by an arbitration award, the primary basis was a strong
contention that the matter involved was an unfair labor practice and within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board under
the doctrine of the Garner case. 1 This was a discharge case, and besides a
claim of discrimination because of union activities, the discharge was alleged
to be an unjust punishment for minor misconduct. The court eliminated the
first matter as being exclusively for the National Labor Relations Board,
but held the second was a proper matter for an arbitration award, and
rendered judgment for the employee and the union in their suit to compel
the company to comply with the award. Thus the absence of an applicable
statute did not prevent effective enforcement of the arbitration award."
The process of voluntary arbitration is working exceptionally well in this
area without benefit of statute, and the theory being followed is that we
should let well enough alone. True, Missouri has an arbitration statute of
1825 vintage, with major amendments in 1835 and a few subsequent thereto,
drafted for commercial arbitration, which is not applied to labor arbitration.

11. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776
(AFL), 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
12. McAmis v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, 273 S.W.2d 789
(Mo. App. 1954).
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It has been the feeling of the Labor Law Committee of the Missouri Bar that
the major elements of strength in labor-management arbitration as it now
exists in this area lie in its completely voluntary character and the unanimity with which all parties honor their obligations to go to arbitration
and to accept the award as final and binding wholly without the intervention of the courts. It has been the fear of this group that if a statute were
enacted with its readily available invitations to petition a court to modify
or vacate an award, these elements of strength might well be weakened or
destroyed." The reasoning of the Committee was somewhat as follows:
At present if a disgruntled party to an adverse arbitration award asks his
lawyer what, if anything, he can do, he is invariably reminded of his agreement to abide by the award as final and binding and is advised that in
good conscience he must do just that, which he always does. But if a statute
like the Uniform Act were in existence, with its seven distinct grounds for
vacating an award plus others as bases for modification, his lawyer must
tell him that it is open to him to petition the court to modify or vacate the
award on the statutory grounds, with the result, so it is feared, that such
awards may no longer be regarded as final, and court intervention may
become common, even be considered the final step, with its attendant delays
and added expense. As expressed by one member, the primary merit of
labor arbitration is that it is quick, inexpensive and final, and it is feared
that such legislation might serve to take away the speed, the simplicity and
also the finality of private voluntary arbitration and subject it to the delays, complications and expense of court proceedings with attendant appeals in a long drawn out procedure wholly inconsistent with the purposes
of the voluntary labor-management arbitration process. Again, voluntarisin
and finality are commonly emphasized as the outstanding features of present
day labor-management arbitration. The weakening or destruction of either
would largely put an end to the major advantages of the arbitration process
'as we now know it. It is the fear that legislation of the sort here under
consideration might have just such an effect that gives rise to the opposition
here indicated.
And while the detailed recital of the experience of the Labor Law Committee of the Missouri Bar set forth above represents only a single state and

13. For the expression of a somewhat similar view, see Proceedings of
Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, March 6, 1953, p. 10,
and May 29, 1953, pp. 45-47.
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is based largely on local experience in Missouri and the Midwest area, representatives of similar committees in some other states, with wide experience
in labor relations and arbitration, indicate the belief that the consensus of
opinion of experienced representatives of both labor and industry in their
states is likewise to the effect that need does not exist for such legislation.
While no effort will be made to list areas from which such reports come,
two states with substantial industry and with committees so indicating are
Massachusetts and Illinois. This is not to suggest that contrary opinions
might not emanate from other areas, or even from some persons of experience in the same areas. Of the seventeen "experts" (the term is used advisedly in this case) who were called before the Pennsylvania Governor's
Commission on Labor Legislation referred to above, a majority expressed
themselves as favoring some legislation in this field, though several would
restrict the coverage quite narrowly.
There comes from the testimony before that Commission the very strong
suggestion that in any case legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration should not go further than to modify the common law to the extent
of providing that agreements to arbitrate should be recognized as valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract, with a possible provision for a stay
of litigation in any controversy to which a valid agreement to arbitrate is
applicable, and leave the problems of enforcement to the general powers of
the court without any further statutory aid."' One important reason for this
suggestion is the belief that if the statute sets up detailed provisions for
court intervention, a great many more cases of resort to court proceedings
are likely to occur, just because the statute has made them readily available." This same point of view is emphasized by another witness before
this Commission by saying "if you attempt to regulate arbitration proceedings . . . and how the award is to be enforced . . . you will have to
set up a fairly comprehensive scheme of judicial procedure for enforcement,
review and so forth, and if that exists on the statute books it will be taken
advantage of wherever there is a dispute by any party about arbitration of
a particular case". This he illustrates by saying, "where you have a
statute . . . and it says so and so, and I must make my move to stay the
arbitration within ten days . . ., then the party is apt to say, what do

14. Id., May 29, 1953, at pp. 44, 45.
15. Id. at pp. 54, 55.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

I have to lose, let's have a motion to stay the arbitration. Whereas, to go
into court for an injunction against the arbitration, he will . . . do it
only if he has a very strong case."" Anything that would have a tendency
to encouragb or increase resort to the courts at any stage of the arbitration
process is widely -viewed as most undesirable, both because of the practical
effect upon the operation of the process in the particular case and because
it is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic purposes which voluntary
labor-management arbitration is intended to serve.
It is probably not inappropriate to take a closer look at the basis upon
which the alleged need for such legislation is said to exist on the one hand
and denied on the other. Apparently those taking the two opposing views
may very well base their conclusions on the same experience in some instances. For example, Mr. Noble Braden, Dean Wesley Sturges and Mr.
Clarence E. Stewart appearing before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation all indicated approval of the idea of having
such legislation, yet the highest estimate they gave for any area of the percentage of cases in which resort to the courts had taken place was something
less than 2 per cent.' It was pointed out that the high mark in New York
had been approximately 200 cases in one period out of a total of some 10,000
to 12,000, and that usually the percentage was lower. No other state is even
alleged to approach this percentage unless it might be Connecticut, and
both states have had legislation of the sort here under consideration for
several years. To what extent the presence of such legislation may have
contributed to an inclination to make use of it, it is not possible to judge.
The testimony of one witness here referred to, applicable to a single large
company having some 250 arbitration cases a year for more than ten years
scattered throughout several states, asserted that in only one case had an
effort been made to go to court.1 8
One arbitrator with long, extensive and distinguished experience in the
field of labor appearing before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission
testified that, out of all of the many cases in which he had served, in only
two instances had a party sought to go to court.1' One of the most widely
experienced arbitrators in the country, Dr. George W. Taylor, also testify-

16. Id. at pp. 46, 49.
17. Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, February 16, 1953, pp. 10, 40; March 6, 1953, p. 95.
18. Id., April 8, 1953, at pp. 28-30.
19. Id., February 23, 1953, at p. 21.
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ing before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission, stated that "of all the
decisions I have ever issued (as a labor arbitrator) none of them went to
court, and they are in the thousands". He further stated that he "only
had one decision where either party refused to follow it". In that case the
Union struck because management refused to abide by the decision."° Still
another experienced arbitrator testifying before the same Commission,
stated that out of more than 900 cases he had decided, only one went to
court. 1
Perhaps the strongest statement in this regard presented to this Governor's Commission to indicate the almost universal disinclination of parties
to collective bargaining agreements calling for arbitration to carry their
controversies into the courts, came from Mr. Donald J. Sherbondy, Assistant
General Counsel for the Pittsburg Plate Glass Company. He pointed out
that the company had some 30,000 employees in plants scattered throughout the United States, with more than 230 collective bargaining agreements,
all, or practically all, containing arbitration and no-strike provisions since
their so-called "industrial peace clause" was inaugurated in 1946. Since
that date, with hundreds of cases going to arbitration, "there has not been
a single instance in which either the Company or the Union has gone to
court to enforce an agreement to arbitrate labor disputes or to seek any
action with respect to a labor arbitration award. The parties don't want
to go to court." 2
The really phenomenal record of voluntary compliance with arbitration
awards has been indicated by reference to results of specific studies. "For
example", it is reported that "during the ten years ending in 1945, over
1,500 cases were heard by the impartial chairman in the full fashioned
hosiery industry, without one case of non-acceptance. In the men's clothing
industry in New York, out of 898 cases referred to arbitrators between 1924
and 1936, in only seven cases was there wilful non-compliance with an arbitrator's decision, and only two went to the courts. Not one of the first
1,616 cases heard by the National Railway Mediation Board went to the
courts. Only six of the first 5,000 cases heard by the Railroad Adjustment
Board were litigated"."' Another study of more general and varied labor
20.
21.
of the
22.
23.

Id., at p. 53.
Id., March 6, 1953, p. 57, Dr. Robert P. Brecht of the Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania.
Id., April 8, 1953, at p. 95.
Dowell, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in Labor Disputes,

3 RUTGEPs L. REv. 65 (1949).
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arbitration cases based on reports by the parties involved in them, reported
that "In only 51 of the 16,819 arbitrations 0.3 per cent in which
the respondents participated in the prior two year period did either party
refuse to accept the award". 2 ' What percentage of this small number, if
any, may actually have gone to court is not revealed.
Responses to a questionnaire recently sent by the writer to some 200
experienced labor arbitrators throughout the United States revealed, that
out of 47,092 cases heard by the arbitrators replying, during the past ten
years, a party had declined to follow an award in only 81 cases, and only
51 cases reached the courts. In other words, only slightly more than one
case in a thousand, or one tenth of one per cent go to court, and in less
than two tenths of one per cent does a party fail to comply voluntarily with
the award. With the exception of the approximately 2 per cent reported
for an unusually high period in New York, the three tenths of one per cent
represents the high point of refusal to accept arbitration awards above
referred to, and apparently only a small fraction of those actually went to
court.
As to the higher percentages in New York, it should be observed that
these include commercial arbitration cases in which the inclination to go
to court appears to be much greater and for the disposition of which the
courts are better fitted. It appears to be true, however, that even when restricted to labor-management arbitration, resort to the courts has been
substantially greater in New York than elsewhere.
Many have inclined to the judgment that the presence of a statute in
New York over a period of many years with its numerous bases for court
intervention, in effect inviting resort to the courts by any disgruntled party,
is largely responsible for the unfortunate experience in this regard in that
state. Accordingly it has been frequently suggested that the experience
with litigation under the New York Arbitration Act stands as a warning
that legislation in this field may well do more harm than good.
There are no figures available in most jurisdictions, but obviously in
the great majority of areas the percentage of cases in which either party
seeks to invoke the aid of a court is infinitismally small, in others wholly

24.

Warren and Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 INDUST. & LAB.

REL. Rnv. 200, 217 (1951). The authors of this report indicate that because of
certain duplications the stated percentage was probably too high.
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non-existent. It is, therefore, obvious that the demand for legislation providing for recourse to the courts is not based on any general or widespread
practical need, if one may base judgment on the frequency with which a
party to an arbitration agreement resorts to a court, or, for that matter,
fails to carry out an award voluntarily.
No attempt will be made by the writer to give a definitive answer to
the question whether such legislation as here under consideration is desirable, but rather to point up the questions that must be faced by those
responsible for legislation in any particular state where the issue is raised.
Among the questions that must be considered is that of whether there
is practical and substantial need for legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration under the circumstances existing in the particular jurisdiction. Is there danger that the presence of such legislation may weaken the
basic strength of voluntary arbitration as it now exists? Is it better and
more consistent with the basic purposes of voluntary labor-management
arbitration to leave the extremely few cases in which a party refuses to go
to arbitration under his agreement, or refuses to abide by an award, to the
devices of the parties themselves, or to a resort to the common law and
equitable remedies already available rather than to inject the courts into
the process by means of legislation such as is now being proposed?
If there be areas in which either labor or management, or both, create
a problem by refusing to honor their obligations to go to arbitration, or to
abide by and carry out arbitration awards, then legislation may be desirable. 'Where such a situation does not exist, as it certainly does not in
the mid-west area, and as it apparently does not in most areas, such legislation could serve no useful purpose and might well do much harm.

III. IF LEGISLATION IS DESmABLE,

SHOULD rr BE SEPARATE FROM THAT

APPLICABLE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION?

In any jurisdiction in which the prevailing opinion may support the
need for legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration, the second
question as to whether such legislation should be kept separate and distinct,
or whether it may properly take the form of amendments to an existing
commercial arbitration statute, or be enacted as a comprehensive statute
applicable to both, becomes an extremely important question.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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A. Arguments for Separate Legislation
As previously indicated, nearly all existing legislation dealing with this
matter has been drafted primarily or exclusively for commercial arbitration,
and in some instances, by amendment, a provision has been inserted making
it applicable to labor-management arbitration, possibly without, as some
allege, sufficiently careful consideration of whether existing provisions are
appropriately applicable to labor-management arbitration. The second sentence of Section 1 of the new Uniform Arbitration Act is somewhat of the
nature of the usual amendment and reads as follows:
"This act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers
and employees or between their respective representatives, [unless
otherwise provided in the agreemelit.]" (Emphasis supplied.)
This language, especially with the word "also", would seem to be more
consistent with a purpose to amend an act otherwise specifically applicable
to commercial arbitration so as to make it also applicable to labor-management arbitration than to indicate the coverage of an act drawn originally
to so apply. It is the belief of many that a large number of the provisions
of this act that may be appropriately applicable to commercial arbitration
have no proper application to labor-management arbitration.
It is broadly recognized, of course, that there are fundamental distinctions between commercial arbitration and labor-management arbitration,
that the relationships between the parties in the two cases are fundamentally different, and that the two types of arbitration are designed for very
different purposes. Commercial arbitration concerns itself with the business
relations between parties who deal with each other at arms length, frequently in a single business transaction, commonly on a temporary basis which
may terminate in a very short time, with no purpose on the part of either
party to renew the relationship, and which, in any event, is likely to be
brought to an end by the controversy which eventuates in the arbitration.
Any arbitration proceeding growing out of such a relationship comes as a
substitute for litigation and deals with problems commonly of a legal nature,
with which courts are familiar and to which ordinary court procedures are
properly and appropriately applicable. The parties to a commercial contract provide for arbitration as a more speedy and less expensive method
of settling their disputes than by the law suit which they thereby hope to
avoid, but if the arbitration process should fail the parties quite naturally
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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fall back on judicial intervention which would have been their sole reliance
had they not agreed upon arbitration as a substitute therefor. Awards in
such cases most commonly involve a matter of dollars and cents fulfillment
of a contract obligation or come as compensation or damages for a breach
thereof. And the necessity for a speedy and final disposition between parties
who are probably parting business company permanently is likely to be a
matter of relatively little gravity as compared with the urgency involved in
a labor controversy where the economic relationship of the parties is such
that they must continue to live together and work together, where an undue
delay in the final disposition of any controversy adversely affects that continuing relationship, where the effective and expeditious disposition of one
controversy may well prevent another from arising, and where the failure
to accept an arbitration award as final and binding is likely to leave a
permanent scar upon their long time relationship.
In emphasizing both the need for speed and an essential difference between the two types of arbitration, Dean Wesley A. Sturges asserted before
the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission that "The potential strike or
lockout which may be associated with, or in the background of labor controversies also press for a speedy determination of the issues-and more
speedy than court dockets can accommodate.'"
As contrasted with commercial arbitration, labor-management arbitration is a substitute for resort to economic force. It is a substitute for the
strike or the lockout, or the threat thereof. More realistically and more accurately, perhaps, it may be regarded as a mechanism provided for averting or preventing the strike and the lockout. And it deals not with dollars
and cents issues but with complex problems of seniority, work week, work
day, reporting pay, job posting and bidding, job evaluation, job classifications, job descriptions and job content, employee qualifications, lay-offs,
promotions, discipline, absenteeism, incentive plans, piece rates, and many
other complicated and technical matters, based upon the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement setting up the working rules to govern the
day-to-day relationship between an employer and his employees, with which
the average court is totally unfamiliar, to the disposition of which the court
process is ill adapted, and which must be disposed of finally without delay

25. Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, March 6, 1953, p. 28.
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if the continuing relationship of management and labor is to operate effectively. Unlike commercial arbitration which commonly marks the end
of the relationship between the parties involved, labor-management arbitration bears no similarity in its purposes or its effects to a suit for damages
for which commercial arbitration is likely to be a substitute. Instead, it involves controversies that call for equitable solutions designed to enable the
parties to go on living together and working together in harmony.
The process of labor-management arbitration is not only unrelated to
the judicial process in its reason for being, in contrast with commercial arbitration, but it is the capstone of a system of self-government which the
parties have devised for themselves to prevent work stoppages and other
economic strife, and in the operation of which complete avoidance of court
intervention is a prime objective. It has been emphasized that the interpretation of provisions in a collective bargaining agreement, intended to
promote industrial peace by the use of a privately agreed upon grievance
procedure in which voluntary private arbitration is the final step, and the
interpretation and application of a statute directed to the implementation
and enforcement of awards arising therefrom, must be regarded as quite
different from the interpretation and application of a statute directed
primarily to the expeditious enforcement by the courts of dollars and cents
awards arising from arbitration of ordinary commercial disputes. The
handling of a matter effectively to promote industrial peace is likely to
be very different from both commercial arbitration and court determination.
Many provisions of the average commercial arbitration statute, dealing
with enforcement, review and possible vacation of awards, which may serve
a useful purpose in that connection, may well be regarded, because of their
consequent delaying effect, among others, as being of highly questionable
propriety in a statute applicable to labor-management arbitration. Suggestions have accordingly been made that legislation applicable to labormanagement arbitration, if any is to be had, should not only be separate
from that applicable to commercial arbitration, but also that it should be
confined to a declaration that provisions in collective bargaining agreements
for the arbitration of future disputes, or any agreement between an employer and a labor organization to arbitrate an existing dispute, shall be
valid and enforceable and that the matter of any possible resort to the
courts should be left to a common law basis.
It is common practice to refer to a collective bargaining agreement as
a contract, and it is relatively easy for the uninitiated to jump to the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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conclusion that the same provisions made applicable to the process of
arbitration under contracts involved in commercial relationships can properly be made equally applicable to arbitrations arising under contracts
between an employer and a labor union. Perhaps the fallacy in so easily
arriving at this conclusion stems from the initial inaccuracy in such use
of the term contract. The similarity between the ordinary commercial contract commonly involved in arbitration and the comprehensive and complex
collective bargaining agreement between a major corporation and the labor
organization representing its employees, is almost totally non-existent.
Though commonly called a contract, the latter is more nearly a code of
regulations controlling the maze of relationships of the parties and intended to endure, with minor revisions from time to time, for an indefinite
period. While it may, and usually does, have a fixed termination date,
neither party has any notion that their relationship will come to an end as
of that date, or that the major provisions of the existing agreement will
not continue without substantial change.
In such an agreement the parties have devised their own system,
through their grievance procedure, for the settlement of all disputes arising
between them, and with arbitration as the final step in the process, intended
to be completely final and binding without the possible intervention of any
other authority.
As contrasted with the ordinary commercial contract with its specific
terms dealing with relationships capable of precise evaluation and with
which the courts are accustomed to deal, the typical collective bargaining
agreement is essentially an instrument of self government or a set of
working rules designed by the parties, to govern their day to day dealings
with each other, commonly completed under the pressure of a midnight
deadline, never providing for all of the eventualities likely to arise, and
frequently embodied in language resulting from compromise and lacking
in clarity or exactness to express the will of either party, much less the
complete understanding of both. As one writer has expressed it, "Labor
agreements are drawn in an atmosphere of tension. Out of a cauldron of
controversy which might have been pot-boiling for days, if not weeks,
comes the molten product of a meeting of the minds which is hammered
into language, frequently by lay people. The very wide scope of the usual
arbitration clause .. .reflects the expectation of the parties that matters
would surely come up in the day-to-day implementation of the agreement,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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which the parties did not cover as completely as they might have done were
they not engaged in a type of controversy which generally requires urgent
resolution." 2 Such an instrument acquires clarity of meaning and stability
within the understanding of the parties only through the practice of the
parties themselves in its day-to-day application and administration in the
process of grievance settlement and through arbitration. This is wholly
and completely different from the commercial contract and commercial
arbitration. The two are established for different reasons, the parties involved bear vastly different relations to each other, and the effect of the
two processes upon the future relations of the parties is almost certain
to be entirely different. The one type of arbitration deals with an agreement which contemplates a continuing relationship which must go on
indefinitely, even though the detailed meaning of the terms of the agreement may never be minutely defined, and within the application of which
new and unforseen contingencies will continue to arise which in turn must
be subjected to the process of rational solution for which the agreement
provides. The other type comes into operation when one party is accused
of violating the terms of a more specific contract and is merely a short
cut for court litigation in a relationship already broken beyond repair
in many instances before the remedy comes into operation. Any delay
through resort to a court at some stage in this arbitration process, even to
vacate or modify an award, runs no great risk of injuring a sensitive and
continuing relationship. Such is definitely not true in the case of labormanagement arbitration.
The different relationship between labor and management and the
very different problem of settling disputes arising under their agreements
are well indicated by a leading representative of labor in a prepared statement presented to the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor
Legislation when he said: "The collective bargaining relationship is a
living, changing, dynamic one. Disputes which arise under a labor contract where the parties live and work together every day," and, it may be
added, must continue to do so regardless of the outcome of any dispute,
"must be settled quickly, inexpensively, and with a view more to smoothing
the relationship for the future than to which side may be right in the

26. Mayer, Arbitration and the Judicial Sword of Damocles, 4 LAD. L.
723, 725 (1953).
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particular dispute to be settled." By way of emphasizing the unsuitability
of the courts to perform this function directly, and as a preliminary to
his later emphasis upon the strictly limited scope within which courts should
be permitted to deal with the arbitration process in the labor field, he
adds, "Judges are particularly unsuited to perform this function," they
"are unfamiliar with complex subjects of incentive plans, job evaluations,
seniority, et cetera, which are part of the fabric of labor agreements."
Again he says, "labor arbitration is an entirely different institution from
commercial arbitration, and a statute which is designed for the latter does
not necessarily meet the needs of the former.2 ' It is upon such a basis
that the great majority of published statements which the present writer
has been able to find urge very strongly that legislation, if any is to be
had, applicable to labor-management arbitration should be separate from
that applicable to commercial arbitration, that it should be much less
comprehensive than the usual statute applicable to the latter, and that the
opportunities for resort to the courts should be very much more narrowly
restricted. The fact that a comprehensive statute with more or less elaborate provisions for judicial enforcement and review of arbitration awards,
and of the obligations to go to arbitration may be regarded as appropriate
in relation to the ordinary commercial contract providing for the arbitration process, does not necessarily mean that the same would be appropriately applicable to the relationship under a collective bargaining
agreement that also provides for arbitration as the final step in its grievance
procedure.
In many areas, and particularly is that true in the Middle West with
which the present writer is most intimately familiar, the refusal to honor
an obligation under a collective bargaining agreement to go to arbitration
just does not arise, as apparently it frequently does under the commercial
contract, and which is contemplated under Section 2 (a) of the Uniform
Arbitration Act, Section 1450 of the New York Act, " and corresponding

27. Statement of Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg, General Counsel, Congress of
Industrial Organizations and the United Steelworkers of America, CIO, Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission, April 8, 1953, pp. 61-62, 65.
It is of interest to note that of the seventeen highly experienced persons called
to testify before this Commission, nine emphasized the viewpoint thus expressed,
while five did not testify specifically with respect to this aspect of the problem,
and only three doubted that it was necessary to keep the legislation separate.
28. Section 1462, Article 84, Civil Practice Act of New York.
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sections of other similar statutes. Instead, serious controversy may arise
as to the arbitrability of a particular dispute. Apparently, the determination of that issue would be devolved upon the court under the statutes
just referred to, and such has happened frequently under the New York
statute, yet no statement regarding this problem by any person conversant
with the problems of labor-management relations and labor-management
arbitration has been found that has been other than a rather urgent insistence that the problem of arbitrability, involving, as it necessarily does,
a matter of interpretation of the agreement, should be decided, and decided
with the same finality as other issues, by the arbitrator.
Finally, it is suggested that if the same statute is being applied to
both types of arbitration, court decisions under it in commercial arbitration cases may by confusion be improperly applied as precedent for cases
involving labor-management arbitration, to which their application may
be highly inappropriate. To the extent that a decision dealing with the
former may be used indiscriminately as a precedent for dealing with a case
of the latter type, the result may well be most unfortunate. The possibility
of using inapplicable precedents arising out of commercial arbitration
cases in the disposition of a labor-management arbitration case is widely
emphasized as a reason for keeping the statutes separate. In this connection in emphasizing that some provisions appropriate enough in a statute
applicable to commercial arbitration have no proper place in a statute
applicable to labor, it is strongly urged that what may be valid grounds
for modifying or vacating a commercial award may have no validity when
applied to labor. The extent to which a court may be permitted to review
a commercial award dealing with matters with which a court is fully
familiar is one thing, while the same review of the issues of a labor arbitration with which the court is wholly unfamiliar is something very different
and may do great harm to the labor-management relationship. It is also
emphasized as major considerations that the procedures in the latter case
need to be much more expeditious and the scope of review needs to be much
more restricted.
B. Arguments Against Separate Legislation
The arguments against separate legislation seem to be primarily of
two types. First is the general statement that in those states where a single
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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existing statute is applicable to both commercial arbitration and labormanagement arbitration it appears to work fairly satisfactorily.2
The second argument, not infrequently prefaced by a statement of
some of the major differences and some of the reasons for keeping the two
separate, suggests that such a separation might well tend to confusion of
handling on the part of the courts if considerably different statutes are
enacted to apply to the two types of arbitration. A court would find it
cumbersome and confusing, we are told, to have one set of rules or statutory
provisions applicable to commercial arbitration and a different set applicable to labor-management arbitration, with a probable tendency on the
part of the court to merge the two, or confuse their interpretation and
application.
A third very frank suggestion is made on the part of some who favor
such legislation to the effect that for practical purposes a demand for a
separate statute might well tend to divide and weaken the support for the
passage of legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration. Whether
this should be listed as a rational argument for a single comprehensive
statute applicable to both seems highly questionable. No other reasons or
arguments for the single statute applicable to both have been encountered.

IV.

SHOULD SuCon LEGISIATION BE ON A STATE LEVEL OR A

NATIONAL LEVEL I
The movement for legislation of the type here under consideration
has largely been on a local basis among the individual states, except for
urgings of officials of the American Arbitration Association and the activities of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws directed to the formulation of the Uniform Arbitration Act, and
this, of course, contemplates action on a state level.
The principal basis upon which it is suggested that such legislation
should be on a national level is that the great bulk of labor relations
problems involve interstate commerce, and that with collective bargaining
being widely conducted on a company-wide or industry-wide basis, legisla-

29. Substantial doubt may be raised as to the soundness of this observation
by reference to the materials cited infra, note 32.
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tion should be uniformly applicable throughout the area to which the
agreement out of which an arbitration controversy arises is made to apply.
In this connection suggestions have been made for national legislation, some by way of amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, others
for the addition of amendments to Section 301 of the Labor Management
:Relations Act.
A. If on a State Level, is a Uniform Act Desirable?
Some of the same reasoning noted above with reference to industrywide bargaining, et cetera, has been made the basis of the suggestion that
if legislation of this type is to be on a state level it should be by way of
a uniform act. It is suggested, for example, that a company may have
plants in a number of states, all under control of the same collective bargaining agreement, and that arbitration controversies arising in the different states under that agreement, possibly under the same provisions
and the same or similar facts, ought to be controlled by the same legislation.
On the other hand, it is also suggested from other quarters that in view
of the widely varying experience in the field of labor-management arbitration from state to state or from one industrial area to another, and the
consequent differences of opinion as to the need for such legislation, the
matter ought to be left on an individual state basis. Some will want no
legislation and see the need for none. Some may want only the simplest
sort of an act that merely provides for making agreements to arbitrate
valid, binding and enforceable, with or without some allegedly more expeditious machinery for enforcement of awards. Still others may feel that
a more comprehensive statute similar to the New York Act or the Uniform
Act will best meet their needs. From this point of view it is strongly
contended that it should be left wholly on an individual state basis.
In this latter connection it has been suggested that the activity of the
National Conference, if any, might better have been directed to the proposal of a Model Act rather than a Uniform Act.
The Labor Law Committee of The Missouri Bar directed its Chairman
to advise the National Conference of its opposition to a uniform act on this
subject. Its reasoning was based on the proposition that this whole field
is relatively new and still in the developmental stage, and that if any
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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legislation is to be had it should remain, at least for a substantial period
of time, on an experimental basis from state to state; that thinking on the
matter has not sufficiently jelled and that experience is not sufficiently
mature in the field of labor-management arbitration to justify an attempt
at uniform legislation at this time.
It would seem that all of these suggestions are worthy of serious consideration by those confronted with the problem.
V. DESIRABLE CONTENT OF SUCH LEGIsLATIoN
While no effort will be made here to formulate proposed legislation
which the present writer would consider desirable or acceptable, it does
not seem inappropriate to comment on certain provisions in existing
statutes, and particularly on those in the Uniform Arbitration Act now
submitted to the states for adoption. To comnient on every provision of
the Uniform Act would unduly extend this article, but those giving rise to
most differences of opinion will be subjected to some discussion.
Generally speaking, all who look with any favor upon the idea of
having legislation in this field accept the desirability of provisions making
agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes valid, binding and
enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract, as set forth in Section 1 of the Uniform ActPerhaps a substantial majority of this group would also accept the idea
of including what is expected to be expeditions machinery for the enforcement of arbitration awards. There are, however, illustrative of the manyvarying opinions on this problem, exceptions to both and several have
suggested the former without the latter.
As indicated earlier, much greater contrariety of opinion develop&
after this point is passed.
Section 3 of the Uniform Act authorizes appointment of arbitrators
by the court on application of a party, where the parties have not stipulated
in their arbitration agreement for such selection or where one selected
fails to act. It is to be observed that the selection of an arbitrator is regarded by the parties to a labor-management arbitration as an extremely
important matter, and it is frequently attended with very considerable
difficulty. In this connection it is seriously questioned whether the local
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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trial court, as would be involved in accordance with Sections 17 and 18,
is likely to be in a very advantageous position to make a wise selection.
With all due respect to the judiciary, it is not inappropriate to observe
that many local trial courts are not well informed with respect to problems
even of labor law, that they are less well informed about the broad range
of problems involved in labor-management relations, and that they are
almost totally unfamiliar with problems of labor-management arbitration.
To suggest that such a court is not likely to know, or to be possessed of a
list of, qualified available arbitrators, or to be in a position to judge of
the proper qualifications, is not to cast any reflections upon the court.
Some other public agency, such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service or a state mediation board, or a private agency such as the American
Arbitration Association, might well be in a much better position to perform
the task effectively. Opposition to statutory provision for court appointment of arbitrators has also been expressed by many on the theory that it
weakens the voluntary aspect of the arbitration process, whereas the
voluntary agreement of the parties to have the arbitrator selected by a
designated agency when they fail to agree, does not have the same effect.
Section 5 of the Uniform Act providing for the hearing authorizes a
determination upon the evidence produced, entitles the parties to present
evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses, while
a later section authorizes the use of subpoenas for the production of evidence and the taking of depositions for use as evidence. There is no
elaboration of the word evidence as thus used, and whether it may be
susceptible to the interpretation that the legal rules of evidence are applicable may be something less than entirely clear. The fact that past practice
in labor-management arbitration has been against application of the statutory or common law rules of evidence would not necessarily control the
interpretation. In view of the fact that there has been a very widespread
practice in the framing of legislation applicable to the procedures of administrative agencies to make express provision for relief from the application of legal rules of evidence to the extent considered desirable, and in
view of the further fact that some current tendencies are in the direction
of requiring greater adherence to the common law or statutory rules of
evidence in what are originally intended to be wholly informal procedures,
the case for clarification of this matter would seem to be a strong one.
Certainly compulsory adherence to the exclusionary rules of evidence would
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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be hard to square with the traditional development of the voluntary labormanagement arbitration process, to say nothing of the difficulty of their
application at the hands of lay arbitrators. Under the statute as worded,
could the admission of hearsay or other "imeompetent" evidence be held
to provide a basis for vacating an award under Section 12 as amounting
to the conduct of the hearing "contrary to the provisions of Section 5,
[so] as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party"? If the effect of
Section 5 is at all doubtful in this respect, as the present writer fears it
may be, clarification would certainly seem to be highly desirable.
If there is any possibility that Section 6 of the Uniform Act authorizing
a party to be represented by an attorney could be interpreted to require
such representation, it should be clarified so as to make it clear that a
party may present his own case, be represented by an attorney, or by any
other representative he may see fit to select. The decision to be represented
by an experienced attorney may be very wise, but the rather widespread
practice of having arbitration cases presented by the business agent, international representative, or other official of the union, and by the director
of industrial relations of the employer should not receive statutory discouragement so long as we are dealing with voluntary labor-management
arbitration.
There is widespread objection to the provisions of Section 7 of the
Uniform Act authorizing the use of subpoenas and depositions, and presumably their enforcement by contempt process at the hands of the court,
and the introduction of witness fees, as being wholly unnecessary in labormanagement arbitration, and as being basically inconsistent with the whole
voluntary character of the proceeding. These provisions are largely taken
from corresponding provisions of the American Arbitration Association's
Model Act and are similar to those contained in the usual commercial arbitration statute. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that voluntary
labor-management arbitration as it has developed to date in this country
is commonly a very informal proceeding, and desirably so. It is highly
doubtful that it could have met with such widespread acceptance if it had
been otherwise. Reasons against keeping it thus informal are not apparent.
The more similarity to court procedure that is introduced and the more
opportunities there are provided for court intervention, the further we
depart from the voluntary aspect of its origin and the more likely we are
to destroy the easy spontaneity of the present informal process. It very
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956
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seldom happens that either party is dependent upon an unwilling witness,
and almost without exception, the parties are willing to present any witnesses and provide any materials that are requested by the arbitrator,
and do it in conformity with the easy informality that pervades the whole
of the present voluntary process. There is also the further possibility that
the provision for depositions may cast doubt on the continued usability of
affidavits in evidence as is generally recognized at present. The fact needs
to be kept in mind that this is the process set up by the parties and not a
public trial. The process is theirs and the machinery is of their own
devising. If they have found no need for subpoenas and depositions, and
there is no evidence that they have, there seems to be no reason for forcing
their use upon them. In like fashion the provision for fees for the attendance of witnesses is wholly unrealistic as applied to labor-management
arbitration. Witnesses are practically always employees or officers of the
company called from their jobs to testify and returned when the need for
their presence ceases, and without loss of pay. No doubt these provisions
may have an appropriate place in commercial arbitration, but the need for
them is not apparent in relation to labor-management arbitration. It
seems obvious that these provisions, and many others, have been drafted
with commercial arbitration only in mind, or copied from or patterned
after provisions that were originally so drafted, and without any notion
that they are needed for labor-management arbitration. All of which adds
up to a potent argument for keeping the two statutes separate and not cluttering up any statute applicable to labor-management arbitration with inapplicable and unnecessary provisions. The fact that the arbitrator in a
labor case is quite frequently not a lawyer is also not without its significance
when we consider various proposals that have so strong a tendency to make
over the arbitration process into the image of a court proceeding.
Objection has been asserted to the provisions of Section 10 of the Uniform Act permitting the award to direct the payment of fees and expenses
as being wholly unnecessary in labor-management arbitration, and also as
undesirable since it is traditional and uniform that expenses are shared
equally by the parties. If, as seems probable, the wording of this Section
may be construed as permitting the arbitrator, in the absence of controlling language in the arbitration agreement, to assess the fees and expenses
against a party as is common in the assessment of court costs, it would seem
to be wholly inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between parties to labor-management arbitration.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/6
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This is a good illustration, as there are so many others, of the fact that
the provisions of the Uniform Act are taken from or patterned after the
provisions of acts originally drawn for application to commercial arbitration. As a matter of fact, the Uniform Act itself was apparently drawn
primarily for commercial arbitration with labor-management arbitration
incidentally to be covered also, as indicated in Section I of the Act. In the
case of commercial arbitration, whatever provisions of the parties own de-vising are to be applicable must be found in the arbitration agreement,
-whether drawn up specially for the particular controversy, or contained in
the contract spelling out the particular relationship out of which the controversy arose. The situation is not quite the same in labor-management
arbitration. In a large percentage of the latter cases there exists no arbitration agreement drawn up for application to the particular case, or if
there is it may be a very simple and abbreviated document. But in the
background is the collective bargaining agreement that spells out these matters in considerable detail for purposes of general application, and the parties find it unnecessary to spell them out again in a special arbitration
agreement if one does exist. Even if we assume that the reference to the
arbitration agreement in the statute as contained in Section 10 is to be construed as applicable in all cases to the general provisions for arbitration in
the collective bargaining agreement, the real point is that the draftsmen
must have had in mind the special arbitration agreement in commercial
arbitration and the appropriateness of the provisions of Section 10 in their
application to that type of arbitration. The provisions are not properly
applicable to and are wholly unnecessary for labor-management arbitration.
If, in a rare instance, adequate provision with respect to fees and expenses
is not made either in the collective bargaining agreement or in the separate
arbitration agreement, where there is one, the matter is uniformly agreed
upon at the time of the hearing and the statutory provision is still both unnecessary and undesirable.
The most serious objections to such legislation and the greatest controversies arising therefrom have to do with provisions for court modification or vacation of awards as provided for in Sections 12 and 13 of the Uniform Act. Both the New York statute and the Uniform Act set out several
bases for such court action, those in the latter being listed above.
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It is to be observed that the five bases upon which the New York Act"
authorizes an award to be set aside have been broadly viewed as providing
too wide a leeway for court interference which the courts of that state have
made the basis for an undue and even an unauthorized encroachment upon
the function of the arbitrator. When it is further observed that the Uniform Act sets forth in substance all five of those bases, and then enormously
broadens the leeway for court action by adding two extremely flexible and
indefinite bases, namely, that the award is "contrary to public policy"
[Section 12 (a) (3)], and that "the award is so grossly erroneous as to
imply bad faith on the part of the arbitrators" [Section 12 (a) (6)], it becomes apparent that the possibilities for court action by way of encroachment upon the functions intended to be devolved upon the arbitrator must,
for some time to come, remain a matter of highly uncertain speculation
wherever that Act is adopted.
It is widely suggested that the bases upon which a court may vacate
an arbitration award should be kept to a very low minimum, such as fraud,
corruption, or gross misconduct, absence of a fair hearing, and possibly
that the arbitrator acted outside his authority by deciding something that
was not submitted to him. This last, however, may be fraught with particular dangers in the matter of court review. This fear, so widely expressed,
that the court will indulge in too broad a review, is largely based dn observation of what courts have done under much less broad statutes, particularly that in New York. The same type of objection, and for similar reasons, has been offered against too much leeway being left to the court in
passing upon the issue of whether the arbitration process should be stayed
in a particular case, as generously authorized in Section 2 of the Uniform
Act, or whether an alleged agreement to arbitrate is enforceable and properly applicable under a- specified set of circumstances. Questions of arbitrability passed upon by the courts almost always involve the very matters
of interpretation of the agreement which the parties have intended to leave
to the arbitrator. Several have pointed out the seriousness of the situation
in New York where it is asserted that all too often the courts, in the name
of determining arbitrability, have determined the substance of the issues
involved."
30. Section 1462, Article 84 of the Civil Practice Act of New York.
31. See, e.g., Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor
Legislation, March 6, 1953, p. 44.
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In all of the major divisions of this paper these same considerations
are present. In stating the reasons against having any such legislation, in
contending for. a separate statute applicable to labor-management arbitration from that applicable to commercial arbitration, if legislation there is
to be, and in urging that the leeway for court intervention in any case be
very narrowly restricted, the point of view rests very largely upon the fear
that we may devise a system under which the court will too often and unduly encroach upon the functions of the arbitrator. In the case of commercial arbitration this presents relatively small difficulty. The issues arising under the commercial contract are of the common grist for the judicial
mill, and the worst that happens is that the parties are deprived of their
short cut which they intended to substitute for a court adjudication. But
in the case of labor-management arbitration the complex issues arising under a collective bargaining agreement often present problems with which the
courts are totally unfamiliar and which neither party had any purpose to
submit to judicial determination. The case for those who feel this fear of improper judicial encroachment upon the arbitration process is rather effectively and vigorously buttressed by several ably written articles based on
much careful research." All of these articles present repeated instances of
what are considered abuses of power by the courts, primarily in a single
jurisdiction, by way of encroaching upon the functions intended by the parties to be entrusted to the arbitrator. It would be an unnecessary repetition
and would unduly extend this discussion to attempt here to analyze the numerous cases discussed in these articles. Even judges have warned against
the tendency of the courts to go beyond their proper sphere in the handling
of such cases. Judge Samuel H. Hofstadter in his article, "The Courts and
Arbitration"" warns against the danger that "the court trespass on the domain of the arbitrator, and pass on the very controversy which the parties

32. Cox, Legal Aspects of Labor Arbitrationin New England, 8 ARB. J. (n.s.)
5 (1953); Mayer, Judicial 'Bulls' in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LAB. L. J. 502 (1951), and Arbitrationand the JudicialSword of Damocles,
4 LAB. L. J. 723 (1953); Rosenfarb, The Courts and Arbitration, PROCEEDiNGS
oF NEw YoRx UNIVERsITY'S

SIXTH ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON LABOR, p. 161

(1953); Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on JurisdictionalGrounds,

17 U. OF CH. L. REv. 616 (1950); and Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuFrA~o L. REv. 1 (1952). JEssE:
FRimN's monograph, LABOR AuimTATIoN AND THE COURTS (1952), is perhaps
somewhat more restrained in its criticism of the courts, but is a highly effective

treatment of the same problem.
33. 9 ARB. J.(n.s.) 179, 188 (1954).
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have committed to him." He strongly intimates that the court had exceeded
its proper function when he said, "It is questionable whether this restraint
was manifested in holding not arbitrable, under a comprehensive arbitration
clause, a dispute between buyer and seller arising from the buyer's contention that the seller had not exercised in good faith his contract right to require cash payments in advance of delivery if, in his 'sole opinion', the
buyer's responsibility should become impaired or unsatisfactory to the seller
and that no forbearance or course of dealings should affect the seller's right
to do so.' Is not this the very kind of controversy arbitrators are peculiarly
fitted to decide and which businessmen, in making arbitration agreements,
intend them to decide ?"
In the famous case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. American Communications Associatiqn, involving the question whether a refusal to handle
"hot traffic" is a strike or work stoppage, and whether the tradition and
custom in the industry may be considered in interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, three judges of the New York Court of Appeals in dissent joined in the statement, "That was a pure question of interpretation
and application, and the very kind of question which the parties themselves
had agreed should be decided by the arbitrator alone."'"
It is perhaps correct to say that greatest concern expressed with respect
to what the content of any legislation should be relates itself to a desire to
protect the arbitration process against delays incident upon the intervention
of the courts, and a desire effectively to insulate the arbitrator's function
against an improper encroachment by the judiciary. Both types of considerations weigh heavily with those who conclude that we should leave the
process of labor-management arbitration free from legislative control, that
any legislation applicable thereto that may be passed should be kept separate
from that designed for commercial arbitration, and that legislation, if any,
should be very simple and restrict any possible intervention by the courts
to a very narrow basis.
Conclusions
The present study in its immediate undertaking and in its background
was not intended to be directed so much to arriving at definite conclusions
34. Alpert v. Admiration Knitwear Co., Inc., 304 N.Y. 1 (1952).
35. 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162, 169 (1949).
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as to a portrayal of the opposing points of view, the pros and cons of proposed or possible legislation, and the reasons therefor. As Chairman of the
Labor Law Committee of the Missouri Bar during several years in which
this matter was intermittently under consideration, and as Chairman of the
Labor Arbitration Committee of the Section of Labor Relations Law of the
American Bar Association in 1954-1955, the writer attempted, of necessity,
to approach the problem objectively and without advancing personal judgments or conclusions. Much of the 1955 report written for the latter committee has formed the foundation for and been incorporated in the present
article." In consideration of these problems as a Commissioner for the state
of Missouri in the deliberations of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws when it considered and approved the Uniform Arbitration Act, and in the more exhaustive study of the problems in
the preparation of this article, certain conclusions have become inevitable.
Initially, it should be made clear that commercial arbitration and what
may or may not be desirable by way of legislation applicable thereto is of
no concern to the writer in the present study, but only labor-management
arbitration.
So restricted, the conviction seems inescapable that no legislation is
necessary, and therefore none is desirable, in the midwest area with which
the writer is most intimately familiar. Parties to an agreement to arbitrate
contained in a collective bargaining agreement habitually and with practically complete uniformity honor their agreements, and with equal unanimity abide by the awards issuing from arbitration cases. And this is
peculiarly a field in which legislation should not be imposed without the
demonstrated existence of a real need. Admittedly this conviction is based
primarily on experience and observation, largely of a local nature.
A somewhat extensive and prolonged study of the operation of voluntary arbitration elsewhere in this country compels the belief that there are
very few areas with respect to which the same conclusion would not be
equally valid. The most significant alleged exception is the State of New

36. This committee consisted of eleven members, nine of whom approved the
report and two of whom were not heard from. Most of the arguments pro and
con included in the present article were set out in brief form in that committee
report. Use of the material, which was wholly the composition of the present
writer as committee chairman, has been approved by the Chairman of the Section both for 1954-55 and for 1955-56.
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York, and what its experience might have been without the presence of its
arbitration statute over the past thirty-five years, and its open invitation
to call upon the courts to intervene, no one can know.
Most of the arguments for legislation are highly speculative. This is
well illustrated by the testimony of one industry lawyer before the Pennsylvania Governor's Commission."' After pointing out that with many
hundreds of arbitration cases between his company and various unions over
the past eight or ten years, there had never been a single case in which
either party had sought court action either to enforce the agreement to arbitrate or to carry out an award, and after referring to reports of surveys
indicating the infinitismally small percentage of cases in other areas where
either party failed to honor his obligation, he nevertheless asserted the need
for legislation and said, "We don't have final and binding arbitration if
we don't have an assured procedure to see that agreements to arbitrate are
enforced and that awards are final and binding."
He then points out that there have been several cases in which the
unions have raised a question as to whether his company was carrying out
awards properly, but in every case they were able to work the problem out.
And after saying he trusts that will always be the case, he raises the question, "but suppose it isn't 7 What is the Union's remedy ? " He then asserts
that there ought to be a statute with a clear remedy, otherwise the whole
system of industrial peace based on arbitration might be jeopardized.
It is submitted that the same factual recital might equally well have
been used as the basis for a firm conclusion that no legislation is necessary.
In the same testimony, with reference to the opportunity for court review, and after emphazing the importance of restricting it very narrowly,
some legislation is urged to make it possible for a court to provide a remedy
for a supposed or fictitious situation that just might occur, in which an
arbitrator in a discharge case might feel that not only the discharged employees but also the plant management and the local union are at fault,
and accordingly might not only uphold the discharge but also direct that
the president of the local union and the assistant superintendent of the
plant must be removed. Or, he supposed another case, equally absurd, in

37. Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, April 8, 1953, pp. 94-98.
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which the arbitrator changes the language of the contract. He then concludes that we must have legislation on the basis of which a court can keep
an arbitrator within the scope of his authority. His parting admonition to
the Commission was for prompt action-'"because an ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure.""
This argument is substantially on a par with much presented before
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on the
basis of which the Uniform Act was approved. Not what had happened or
what is happening, but what just might happen. It would seem equally
easy and valid in supposing, that we suppose something more closely akin
to the facts and suppose that the arbitrator is habitually careful to stay
within his authorization. And instead of the "ounce of prevention" and
the "pound of cure", one with a contrary viewpoint might well suggest
that in a situation in which so much more progress has been made toward
the achievement of industrial peace in the past ten or a dozen years than
labor, industry or any one else had dared to hope, that possibly we might
better "let sleeping dogs lie", "let well enough alone", or just not "rock
the boat."
As suggested earlier in the body of the article, if a local'situation exists
in any state where the failure of parties to honor their obligations to go
to arbitration as contained in their collective bargaining agreements becomes a real problem, or where refusal to abide by arbitration awards
threatens to weaken or destroy the effectiveness of labor-management arbitration as an instrument for industrial peace, then legislation would seem
to be justified. But the dangers from unnecessary legislation in this field
are certainly sufficient to caution very strongly against merely stand-by
legislation-just in case.
The second major conclusion that has appeared to the writer as wholly
inevitable is that any legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration, if any there is to be, should be kept wholly separate from that applicable to commercial arbitration. This conclusion is based on several factors,
discussed above, and they will not be rehashed here in detail. First, the
two are wholly different in nature, dealing with entirely different types
of relationships and devised to serve wholly different purposes. The one

38. Id., at p. 98.
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as a substitute for litigation and the other as a substitute for or preventive
of resort to economic force have been sufficiently emphasized heretofore.
Second, existing commercial arbitration statutes, which practically all
existing statutes are, embrace a multitude of details which their sponsors
have believed to be necessary and desirable for commercial arbitration, and
many in a position to be well informed have insisted that the success of commercial arbitration depends upon the existence of an effective statute. It is
firmly the conviction of this writer that most of the provisions of these
statutes are wholly unnecessary for labor-management arbitration and
that many are downright harmful. If it is necessary that the commercial
statute be thus comprehensive, the only reasonable alternative is to keep
the two separate.
Finally, the likelihood, or almost the certainty, that a court will use
decisions in commercial arbitration cases as precedent in cases involving
labor-management arbitration and where they are most likely not to be
appropriate is a very important reason for maintaining the separation.
The third and final major conclusion that seems compulsory is that
if any legislation is to be made applicable to labor-management arbitration, it should be brief and simple, and the opportunity for court intervention should be kept to a very low minimum.
In this connection it is worthy of observation that the Uniform Act
specifies no less than nineteen separate and different specific opportunities for court intervention, with ample provisions for appeal. Six specific
situations are listed in which an appeal may be taken, broadly related to
most of the nineteen opportunities for original court intervention referred
to above, -with the last, in comprehensive fashion authorizing appeals from
any "judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act.'"
It hardly seems necessary to belabor the point that this creates a situation
far removed from the simple, informal, voluntary, final and binding labormanagement arbitration contemplated by the parties when they include
in their collective bargaining agreement what they regard as effective
machinery for the maintenance of industrial peace built around their
grievance procedure and culminating in their no-strike, no-lockout clause

39.

Uniform Arbitration Act, Section 19 (6).
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combined with provisions for final and binding arbitration without provision for or contemplation of intervention by any other authority.
Prolonged study of this problem has served to emphasize the merits
of the suggestion, earlier recorded, that legislation should wisely stop with
the first sentence of the Uniform Act making agreements to arbitrate
existing or future disputes "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract", and leave its enforcement to the general powers of the courts without benefit of further statutory provisions.
In this connection also it is well to recall the warning urged by many
that the bases for court vacation of the arbitration award should be restricted to such matters as fraud, corruption, gross misconduct, or absence
of a fair hearing. Since these bases are all available at common law, the
previous suggestion seems a very meritorious one. And while the common
law procedure may be a bit less expeditious than that which may be provided by statute, when we stop to consider that it is so very seldom necessary to use it, the further suggestion that this weakness, if such it be, is
more than off-set by "freedom from the multitudinous motions to compel
arbitration, motions to stay arbitration, motions to review, and motions to
enforce", with additional motions to vacate, modify or correct on numerous grounds, "which are the inevitable consequences of integrating
labor arbitration into a" comprehensive "procedure intended and probably
necessary for the determination of commercial disputes", ° is certainly
worthy of most serious consideration.
While there are those who appear to object even to the simple statutory provision for enforceability of agreements to arbitrate suggested last
above, emphasizing the belief that the original decisions as to the unenforceability of such agreements was a departure from proper contract
law,' the fact the common law doctrine of unenforceability does exist in
most jurisdictions may seem sufficient justification for such a statutory
enactment. The belief that even so simple a statutory provision as thus
suggested, by providing a basis for compelling arbitration, is inconsistent

40. Proceedings of Pennsylvania Governor's Commission on Labor Legislation, May 29, 1953, pp. 45-46.
41. Id., March 6, 1953, p. 90.
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with the purely voluntary character desirable in labor-management arbitration, is sufficient to create opposition by some students of this problem.
One writer has emphasized this aspect of the problem, based, however, on
the more comprehensive statute, by saying "The commencement of an arbitration proceeding by court compulsion means a vanishing of its voluntary
nature, and a spirit of litigation prevails. Enforced arbitration is not
arbitration." 2 Perhaps it is correct to question whether it is voluntary
arbitration of the sort we wish to preserve.
If this discussion may close by a return to its starting point, it may
be recalled that the principal basic reasons for proposing legislation applicable to labor-management arbitration rest upon the facts that agreements
to arbitrate in the future are not enforceable at common law and that a
party to an arbitration may withdraw at any time before the making of an
award without suffering any adverse legal consequences. If, then, we address ourselves solely to the one major weakness of the present situation,
the simple statutory provision last suggested above for making agreements
to arbitrate enforceable would seem to provide all the remedy that is at
all urgently called for, and without creating most of the weaknesses and
dangers felt to exist in making the more comprehensive statute applicable
to labor-management arbitration.
The major concern of all interested in this problem should be to avoid
any action that might weaken the effective operation of voluntary labormanagement arbitration, or discourage its development as a more effective
agency for the promotion of industrial peace.

42. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a
Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1258, 1267 (1933).
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